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Environmental Personhood and Standing for Nature: 
Examining the Colorado River case 
17 U.N.H. L. Rev. 355 (2019) 
A B S T R A C T .  As the planet faces the growing threat of climate change, environmental advocates 
are searching for alternative legal avenues to protect natural entities in the courts.  In 2017, the 
Colorado River Ecosystem brought a lawsuit against the State of Colorado for violating its 
constitutional rights.  The advocates behind this action were seeking to establish in federal court 
two doctrines that have made strides in other countries as part of the international Rights of 
Nature movement: environmental personhood and standing for nature.  Environmental 
personhood would recognize natural entities as legal persons, endowing them with 
corresponding rights and duties under the law.  Standing for nature would allow such entities to 
litigate their grievances on their own behalf in court.  If courts were to recognize these doctrines, 
advocates would gain a significant tool to protect natural entities from ecological catastrophe.  
However, as an analytical reading of the pleadings in the Colorado River case illustrates, litigants 
must draft robust complaints that specifically address the standing requirements in order to 
make progress on this front. 
In Part I, this Note examines corporate personhood as a possible analogy for the 
development of environmental personhood.  Part II discusses Article III standing as background 
for the justiciability standard environmental litigants must meet and analyzes animal standing 
as another comparative path.  In Part III, the Note turns to the Colorado River lawsuit, critiques its 
pleadings, and suggests that a stronger litigation strategy would have increased the likelihood of 
surviving a justiciability challenge.  Part IV recounts the international successes of the Rights of 
Nature movement to provide a global context for the Colorado River case.  In Part V, the Note 
explores the issues around representation of natural entities in court and how some of these 
challenges might be navigated.  Finally, this Note provides a few concluding thoughts on the path 
forward for environmental personhood and standing for nature. 
A U T H O R .  University of New Hampshire School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2019; University of 
Vermont, M.A. 2012; Providence College, B.A. 2009.  I would like to thank Professor Margaret Sova 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
In September 2017, the Colorado River Ecosystem filed a lawsuit against the 
State of Colorado and Governor John W. Hickenlooper, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief from state action that violated the River’s “right to exist, flourish, 
regenerate, be restored, and naturally evolve.”1  The suit also sought legal 
recognition of these rights and of the River’s standing to appear in court to defend 
them.2  The lawsuit was filed by Denver attorney Jason Flores-Williams, with a 
number of individuals acting as the River’s next friends: five members of the 
environmental organization Deep Green Resistance, the Executive Director of the 
organization Living Rivers, and John Weisheit, identified as the “Colorado 
Riverkeeper.”3  If the action had been successful, it could have opened the door to 
rivers, forests, mountains, and other natural entities claiming legal rights in federal 
court.  However, following the State’s motion to dismiss in December 2017, the 
Ecosystem filed its own motion to dismiss, effectively abandoning its lawsuit.4  It 
explained that because the action was “an effort of first impression,” they had a 
“heightened ethical duty to continuously ensure that conditions are appropriate for 
                                                                    
1  Amended Complaint at 3, Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 17-cv-02316-NYW (D. 
Colo. Nov. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 9472427. 
2  Id. at 2–3. 
3  Id. at 1. 
4  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 17-cv-02316-NYW 
(D. Colo. Dec. 1, 2017), 2017 WL 4699840; Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, Colorado River Ecosystem 
v. Colorado, No. 17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2017). 
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our judicial institution to best consider the merits of a new canon.”5  The court 
dismissed it the next day.6 
While this was the first lawsuit of its kind brought in federal court in the United 
States, it has roots in the international Rights of Nature movement.7  Natural 
entities have been awarded legal rights in New Zealand, Ecuador, Colombia, India, 
and local communities throughout the United States.8  There are two distinct legal 
issues embedded in this global push for the rights of nature.  First, the concept of 
environmental personhood suggests that natural entities should have the status of 
other legal persons, such as corporations, in the eyes of the law.9  Second, the idea 
of legal standing for nature would give these entities access to the legal system to 
seek remedies in response to violations of their fundamental rights.10 
In the United States, the idea of legal personhood for nature was first suggested 
by Professor Christopher D. Stone in his 1972 article, Should Trees Have Standing?—
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects.11  Soon after Stone published his article in the 
Southern California Law Review, Justices William O. Douglas and Harry A. Blackmun 
incorporated Stone’s seemingly radical idea into their dissenting opinions in Sierra 
Club v. Morton.12  In Morton, the majority held that the Sierra Club did not have 
standing to represent the Mineral King Valley in a lawsuit to enjoin the U.S. Forest 
Service from approving a skiing development in southern California’s Sequoia 
National Forest.13  Douglas dissented, reasoning that “[c]ontemporary public 
concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral 
of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.”14  
                                                                    
5  Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 4, at 3. 
6  Order, Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No. 17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2017). 
7  See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 
45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972).  See generally Julie Turkewitz, Corporations Have Rights. Why Shouldn’t 
Rivers?, N.Y. Times (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/does-the-colorado-
river-have-rights-a-lawsuit-seeks-to-declare-it-a-person.html [perma.cc/SM6S-G27E].  For a 
discussion of the Rights of Nature movement, see infra Part V. 
8  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 20–22. 
9  Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 49, 51 (2018). 
10  Hope M. Babcock, A Brook with Legal Rights: The Rights of Nature in Court, 43 Ecology L.Q. 1, 3 
(2016). 
11  Stone, supra note 7. 
12  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42, 757–58 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
13  Id. at 741 (majority opinion). 
14  Id. at 741–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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Blackmun echoed Douglas’s approach, suggesting that he “would permit an 
imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing” to allow the Sierra 
Club and other organizations to litigate environmental issues on behalf of natural 
objects.15  While courts remain skeptical, a growing body of scholarship has 
developed around environmental personhood and standing for nature, as the 
Rights of Nature movement continues to gain traction on the international stage.16 
The legal system constitutes an essential forum for advocates seeking to resist 
the tide of ecological collapse.  Historically, the legal effort to protect the 
environment, whether through legislative action or litigation, has rested upon an 
anthropocentric worldview.17  This effort premised the importance of 
environmental law on the use and enjoyment of nature by human beings.18  The 
growing influence of environmental personhood and standing for nature are a 
result of the gradual shift to ecocentrism in certain countries and communities.19  
This shift will likely accelerate as ecosystems struggle to survive,20 resources 
dwindle,21 and extreme weather events become more commonplace.22  In order to 
                                                                    
15  Id. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
16  Gordon, supra note 9, at 74 (discussing environmental personhood); see infra Part V for a 
discussion of the Rights of Nature movement. 
17  Gordon, supra note 9, at 72–73. 
18  Id. at 73–74. 
19  Id. at 82–83. 
20  See, e.g., Alan K. Brickley et al., Climate Change and Oregon Law: What Is to Be Done?, 33 J. Envtl. 
L. & Litig. 235, 282 (2018) (quoting Susanne C. Moser et al., Coastal Zone Development and 
Ecosystems, U.S. Global Change Research Program, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report
/regions/coasts#narrative-page-16840 [https://perma.cc/8Y2W-27JH]) (“Of particular concern is 
the potential for coastal ecosystems to cross thresholds of rapid change (‘tipping points’), beyond 
which they exist in a dramatically altered state or are lost entirely from the area; in some cases, 
these changes will be irreversible.”). 
21  See, e.g., Water Resources, Or. Climate Change Research Inst., http://www.occri.net/pnw-
impacts/water-resources/ [https://perma.cc/A586-EES4] (last visited Jan. 6, 2019) (“Oregon State 
University’s Oregon Climate Change Research Institute, in its assessment of climate change on 
Pacific Northwest Water Resources, has projected less water available for all uses as a result of 
climate change.”). 
22  See, e.g., Martin Finucane, Extreme Weather Events Are Becoming More Frequent, New Study Says, 
Boston Globe (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/03/22/extreme-
weather-events-are-becoming-more-frequent-new-study-says/c9OdBuONOHYhAAmMnt1L2N
/story.html [https://perma.cc/46PN-H8QK] (“Extreme weather events have become more 
frequent over the past 36 years, according to a new study that calls for increased urgency in 
European efforts to adapt to climate change.”); see also Gordon, supra note 9, at 76 (“[W]hether we 
will be able to bring about the requisite institutional and population growth changes [to stem the 
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adequately address the challenges of climate change, the legal system must 
acknowledge the rights of nature and allow natural entities some measure of 
representation in court. 
This Note first examines the brief history of environmental personhood and 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate personhood as a possible 
analogy.  Part II addresses the corresponding issue of standing for nature, explores 
standing for animals, and addresses authorization to sue under environmental 
statutes.  In Part III, the Note analyzes the pleadings and motions in the Colorado 
River case to find strengths, weaknesses, and potential ways such litigation could be 
more successfully pursued in the future.  In Part IV, the Note reviews other 
breakthroughs by the Rights of Nature movement.  Part V discusses some practical 
issues associated with litigation brought “by” natural objects.  Lastly, the Note 
addresses certain counterarguments and suggests how environmental advocates 
may better seek to establish environmental personhood and standing for nature in 
American courts. 
The lawyers and advocates behind the Colorado River case were attempting to 
establish the Rights of Nature doctrine in U.S. courts.23  However, the plaintiffs’ 
complaint was insufficiently pleaded and failed to satisfy the requirements of 
Article III standing.24  In order to survive justiciability challenges and have their 
cases decided on the merits, individuals and organizations that bring suits on 
behalf of natural entities in U.S. courts must file robust complaints that meet 
standing requirements: tangible and specific injury to the entity, a clear connection 
between the injury and the action complained of, and practical measures that would 
adequately redress the injury.25  I argue that both the environmental personhood 
and standing for nature doctrines can help natural entities meet the requirements 
of Article III. 
                                                                    
tide of human climate devastation] depends in part upon effecting a radical shift in our feelings 
about ‘our’ place in the rest of Nature.” (second alteration in original)). 
23  Angela K. Evans, Rights of Nature Lawsuit Seeks Personhood for the Colorado River, Boulder 
Wkly. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.boulderweekly.com/news/rights-nature-lawsuit-seeks-
personhood-colorado-river/ [https://perma.cc/3BNP-K93K]. 
24  See Greg Herbers & Washington Legal Foundation, A River Runs to Court: Environmental 
Activists Circumvent Democracy to Impose Agenda, Forbes (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2017/11/30/a-river-runs-to-court-environmental-activists-
circumvent-democracy-to-impose-agenda/#39eb95a91189 [https://perma.cc/7Z4T-49GU]. 
25  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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I .  E NV I R ONME NT AL  AND C OR P OR AT E  P E R S ONHOOD 
Personhood is not a stand-alone concept; it is defined and given meaning by 
the law.26  Legal personhood determines the rights and duties of an individual or 
entity under statutory law and the Constitution.27  Since the founding, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has dramatically expanded the definition of legal personhood: 
Constitutional jurisprudence reveals a history of expanding the Constitution’s 
protections to new entities.  Corporations, trusts, ships, joint ventures, municipalities, 
partnerships, and nation-states have all appeared in federal court in their own right to 
prosecute their interests.  Collectives like families, churches, and universities “gained 
legal recognition as actors possessing legal rights, capacities, entitlements, and 
privileges before individuals did,” entitling them to seek judicial relief in their own 
name.  Corporations have particularly found the courthouse door open to them.  This 
trend began in 1819 when the Marshall Court authorized the Trustees of Dartmouth 
College to bring suit against a state-approved secretary of the new board of trustees.  It 
continues to the present in the form of the Roberts Court’s extension of the First 
Amendment to businesses in cases such as Citizens United v. Federal Communications [sic] 
Commission and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.28 
The idea of corporate personhood “was anything but inevitable,”29 but received an 
auspicious welcome in the early nineteenth century.  In Trustees of Dartmouth College 
v. Woodward,30 Chief Justice Marshall held that the Contract Clause protects 
corporate charters from laws passed by state legislatures and wrote that “[a] 
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law.”31  Professor Brandon Garrett argues that while the “artificial” 
language is often employed to denigrate corporate personhood as an ersatz legal 
fiction, “human artifice and creativity was something to be admired” at the time.32  
Garrett goes on to explain the impact of Marshall’s opinion on the Court’s 
subsequent rulings: “[c]orporations may be created by law, but they accomplish 
important goals of individuals, such as protecting property and furthering the 
public good.  The reasoning was consequentialist and pragmatic, and it set the tone 
for the Court’s jurisprudence that followed.”33  At the core of the Court’s 
acknowledgment of corporate personhood, both in 1819 and now, is the idea that 
                                                                    
26  Gordon, supra note 9, at 50–51. 
27  Id. at 50. 
28  Babcock, supra note 10, at 34 (footnotes omitted). 
29  Gordon, supra note 9, at 51. 
30  17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. 518 (1819). 
31  Id. at 636. 
32  Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. Pa. L. Rev. 95, 112 (2014). 
33  Id. 
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corporations are created by individuals to accomplish their economic and social 
goals.34  Thus, they are extensions of people and should be treated as such in court.  
While corporate personhood is now deeply entrenched, “[t]hroughout legal history, 
each successive extension of rights to some new entity . . . has been a bit 
unthinkable.”35  Environmental personhood may be in its “unthinkable” early stage, 
but there is a strong conceptual foundation for it to follow the path of corporations 
into the legal mainstream. 
Decided in 2010, Citizens United v. FEC36 offers a pointed illustration of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporate personhood.37  In that case, the Court 
substantially expanded the power of corporations to influence the political process 
by holding that corporate financial contributions to campaigns were considered 
speech and protected as such by the First Amendment.38  Following that decision, 
corporations were able to contribute essentially unlimited amounts of money to 
“independent” political communications.39  The primary vehicle for such 
communication has been the super PAC, i.e., political action committee, which has 
reshaped modern politics and allowed corporate actors to have a significant impact 
on elections at the federal and state levels.40  Natural entities have no such power to 
influence the political process.  The expansion of the rights of nature could help to 
balance the power of corporations to affect political campaigns post-Citizen United.  
If natural entities were recognized as persons and had the power to represent 
themselves in court, they could develop a similar ability to advocate for their own 
rights in the legal and political arena. 
The extension of rights to nature demands not simply an application or 
reorganization of existing law, but a shift in the epistemological understanding of 
the natural world’s relationship to human society.41  Professor Gwendolyn Gordon 
makes a distinction between how corporate personhood is understood legally and 
socially.42  She argues that while corporate personhood is accepted as a legal fact, it 
would be absurd to refer to a corporate person in the social context: “it makes little 
                                                                    
34  Id. at 111–12. 
35  Stone, supra note 7, at 453. 
36  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
39  Id. 
40  Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1644 (2012). 
41  See Gordon, supra note 9, at 72–76. 
42  Id. at 70. 
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sense to most people strolling along a street to point out that person over there, 
Starbucks.”43  She believes the opposite is true for nature, giving the environment a 
better claim as the “recipient of rights to personhood than the corporation.”44  While 
nature is not created by individuals to pursue their economic and social goals, as 
corporations are, it constantly interacts with and is shaped by humans.  If one 
considers how often every person comes into contact with trees, rivers, fields, 
meadows, and mountains, it becomes clear that nature is the essential fabric of our 
society.45  Moreover, all human beings are part of their ecosystem.46  The 
preservation, development, or destruction of nature has the power to impact 
everyone and everything that interacts with it. 
Courts have recognized three theories of corporate personhood: the grant 
theory, the entity theory, and the association theory.47  The grant theory is 
exemplified by Chief Justice Marshall’s holding in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward: “[b]eing the mere creature of law, [a corporation] possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence.”48  Thus, the corporation’s rights and duties are 
defined by the charter or grant it receives from the state.49 
The natural entity theory conceives of corporations as natural persons—with 
the attendant rights and duties.50  For courts that accept the natural entity theory of 
corporate personhood, personhood for nature could logically be recognized by 
analogy.  If environmental personhood were recognized, normative benefits would 
follow.51  At a time when climate change is accelerating threats to natural 
                                                                    
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 71. 
45  See generally John Muir, Our National Parks (The Riverside Press, Cambridge 1903) (1901) 
(including a collection of Muir’s essays, originally published in the Atlantic Monthly, encouraging 
societal support for the preservation of national wild lands); Henry David Thoreau, Walden 
(1854) (emphasizing the value of self-reliance, solitude, meditation, and nature). 
46  Oliver A. Houck, Are Humans Part of Ecosystems?, 28 Envtl. L. 1, 2 (1998) (asserting that this is 
arguably the case). 
47  Babcock, supra note 10, at 35–36. 
48  Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 (4 Wheat.) U.S. 518, 636 (1819); see Babcock, supra 
note 10, at 35–36. 
49  See 8 Del. Laws § 102 (2018) (defining the contents of a certificate of incorporation). 
50  Matthew J. Allman, Swift Boat Captains of Industry for Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of the 
Natural Person Theory of Corporate Personhood, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 387, 395 (2011). 
51  Babcock, supra note 10, at 36. 
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ecosystems of all kinds,52 granting personhood to nature would provide a necessary 
impetus for cultural and political change.  Corporate personhood has been 
established by courts primarily through the metaphor of the human body.53  This 
approach rests upon a wobbly legal fiction, but by power of repetition and historical 
inertia has become entrenched in our law.  This process of precedent-creation could 
inform the establishment of environmental personhood in U.S. courts.  Nature’s 
personhood could be achieved through a similar body metaphor, as nature’s organic 
composition actually gives it a better claim to legal personhood than the non-
corporeal corporation.  However, in order for a legal precedent around 
environmental personhood to develop, a federal court must first invoke the body 
metaphor and the decision must survive appeal. 
Professor Hope M. Babcock argues that applying the natural entity theory to 
nature “is problematic because if nature can contend it is a unique entity, there 
would be no limit on anything else claiming uniqueness—it is a theory without a 
limiting principle, which is generally disfavored by the courts.”54  The lack of a 
conceptual limiting principle on the definition of personhood under the natural 
entity theory is certainly an obstacle to its acceptance.  However, a practical limiting 
principle exists in the demanding definition of injury under federal standing 
requirements.  Even if courts recognized environmental personhood, the individual 
or organization representing a natural object in court would be required to 
demonstrate concrete and particularized injury.55  The justiciability doctrines 
would maintain their teeth as applied to environmental plaintiffs and would 
prevent a flood of litigation.  On the other hand, entities that are legitimately 
harmed or threatened with harm would be able to pursue necessary judicial 
remedies. 
Babcock argues that only the natural entity theory “supports giving nature 
constitutional standing in court, since no state has granted any rights to nature, nor 
can nature be considered to be an aggregate of members.”56  However, Babcock’s 
narrow view of corporate personhood’s possibilities for nature fails to recognize 
that the association theory may also offer a foothold for establishing environmental 
personhood.  The association theory views the corporation as the aggregate of its 
                                                                    
52  See supra notes 20–22 (describing examples of destruction of ecosystems, dwindling 
resources, and increasingly frequent extreme weather events). 
53  Babcock, supra note 10, at 37. 
54  Id. at 36. 
55  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
56  Babcock, supra note 10, at 36. 
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shareholders or members.57  Under this theory, the corporation is a collection of 
individuals gathered together in a common economic enterprise.58  The rights of the 
corporation, therefore, are an extension of the rights held by the people that make 
it up.59  A natural ecosystem also includes human beings, who contribute to it, 
change it, and occasionally harm it in the same way that people contribute to, 
change, and harm a corporation.60  In this way, nature is an aggregate of its 
components, which include inorganic formations (such as mountains and rocks), 
plants, and animals of all varieties, including humans.  By this reasoning, an 
ecosystem should have the ability to operate as an extension of its component parts 
and to exercise the rights of the people who live within it. 
The association theory is logically superior to the natural entity theory as 
applied to both corporations and natural objects.  The natural entity theory requires 
an uncomfortable cognitive leap to acknowledge the legal personhood of 
nonhuman entities.  Conversely, the association theory establishes a direct 
connection between human beings and the entity.  While the natural entity theory 
offers the more direct route for a Rights of Nature argument, the association 
theory’s foundation in the inseparability of nature and humans is more persuasive.  
In the Colorado River case, the plaintiffs implicitly adopted the natural entity theory 
of corporate personhood for purposes of comparison with environmental 
personhood.61  Even if a court had accepted this theory, the issue of demonstrating 
legal standing would have remained. 
I I .  S T ANDI NG F OR NAT UR E  
Plaintiffs who establish legal personhood must also have standing to bring their 
grievances before a court.  Article III of the Constitution is the source of the 
standing doctrine applied in federal courts.62  Article III limits federal courts to 
hearing “cases and controversies.”63  Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the cases and controversies requirement, plaintiffs must establish that (1) they 
                                                                    
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  See Houck, supra note 46, at 2–5 (explaining that, though humans are part of ecosystems, 
some believe they manage ecosystems in a way that does not benefit, and may indeed harm, the 
other species within the ecosystem). 
61  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
62  U.S. Const. art. III. 
63  Id. § 2. 
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“suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest, which is (a) 
concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical”’”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of 
the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 
party not before the court”; and (3) that it is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”64 
The standing doctrine in environmental cases has undergone a significant 
evolution in the last few decades.  In 1972, Professor Stone believed there was “a 
movement in the law toward giving the environment the benefits of standing” 
through a “marked liberalization of traditional standing requirements in recent 
cases in which environmental action groups have challenged federal government 
action.”65  However, Stone’s prediction was “entirely wrong,” as the standing 
doctrine has been dramatically narrowed, especially for environmental plaintiffs.66  
Since 1990, the Supreme Court’s standing decisions have “contract[ed] the ability of 
plaintiffs to gain access to federal courts to remedy alleged wrongs . . . .”67 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,68 the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ three proffered 
standing theories.69  These included the ecosystem nexus theory, under which any 
person who uses part of a contiguous ecosystem that is adversely impacted by an 
activity funded by the government would have standing to sue.70  The Court held 
that to establish injury, a plaintiff must put forth “a factual showing of perceptible 
harm.”71  This language heightened the barrier for plaintiffs to establish injury.  In 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,72 the Court held that the plaintiffs’ argument 
that there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications 
would be intercepted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was “too 
speculative” and did not satisfy the requirement that the injury be “certainly 
                                                                    
64  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (alterations in original) (footnote and 
citations omitted). 
65  Stone, supra note 7, at 467. 
66  Babcock, supra note 10, at 13.  
67  Id. 
68  504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
69  Id. at 565–67. 
70  Id. at 565–66. 
71  Id. at 566. 
72  568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
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impending.”73  These decisions, among others, have narrowed the standing doctrine 
and made it more difficult for plaintiffs to litigate their cases on the merits.74 
The landscape is “now decidedly bleak for environmental litigants seeking to 
protect some aspect of the natural environment from harm.”75  The current state of 
the Court’s standing jurisprudence suggests that “if nature (or its components, like 
a creek) cannot gain access to the courts to protect itself, it appears less and less 
likely that interested third parties such as environmental organizations will be able 
to step in.”76  Individual or organizational environmental plaintiffs must have 
sustained injury themselves and may not bring an action on behalf of a natural 
ecosystem.77  This reaffirms the importance of establishing environmental 
personhood as a legal doctrine and allowing organizations to bring lawsuits on 
behalf of natural entities.  In order to establish standing for nature, judges must 
have intellectual stepping stones to grasp its significance and to ground an opinion 
recognizing its existence.  A potential analogue rests in the movement behind 
granting standing, and even legal personhood, to animals. 
A. Standing for Animals and Legislative Authorization to Sue 
The current state of the law around animal standing is complex and 
contradictory.78  Cass Sunstein argues that there are three categories of people who 
have standing to sue on behalf of animals: “(1) those deprived of legally required 
information, (2) those facing ‘aesthetic’ injury, and (3) those suffering 
competitively.”79  Animals often appear as named plaintiffs in federal lawsuits, 
though several courts have found that animals cannot bring suit in their own 
                                                                    
73  Id. at 401. 
74  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), adds another dimension to the environmental 
standing debate.  In that case, the Court held that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had 
standing to bring an action against the EPA because states receive “special solicitude in [the] 
standing analysis” because they give up their sovereign rights to enter the union.  Id. at 520.  In 
the opinion, it was clear that Justice Stevens recognized the dire prospects of global warming and 
adjusted his reasoning to allow for speculative injury to Massachusetts’ property that would be 
deemed too tenuous under ordinary circumstances.  Id. at 521–23, 525–26.  This decision could 
open the door to a more liberal standing regime in situations where natural entities are 
threatened by the effects of global warming. 
75  Babcock, supra note 10, at 17–18. 
76  Id. at 18. 
77  Id. 
78  Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Standing (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1333, 1334 
(2000). 
79  Id. at 1334–35. 
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name.80  Sunstein also reaches another conclusion which raises serious issues for 
the quest to establish standing for nature: 
The question of standing is mostly for legislative resolution, and both people and 
animals have standing to protect animals to the extent that Congress has said that they 
do.  Under existing law, this means . . . that animals lack standing to sue in their own 
right, for Congress has restricted standing to “persons.”  But it also means that Congress 
can accord standing to animals if it chooses to do so.81 
This issue ripples through the pleadings in Colorado River.  Each of the four counts 
brought by the plaintiffs is constitutional in nature and none invoke a federal 
statute.82  The plaintiffs hang their hopes for recognition of the River’s standing on 
the definition of “person” in Article III.83  The reasoning behind this approach lies 
in the absence of legislative authorization for such a suit.  Congress has the 
authority to explicitly grant standing to natural objects as part of environmental 
legislation, but has never done so. 
In the 1970s, Congress began to pass modern environmental legislation, and the 
courts developed an environmental standing doctrine for lawsuits brought under 
these new statutes.84  While the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires 
federal agencies to analyze the environmental impact of its activities, does not 
contain a provision for judicial review, the courts have “heard challenges to non-
compliance with NEPA and have consistently held that environmental injury 
conferred standing.”85  The Clean Air Act was the first federal environmental statute 
that contained a citizen suit provision.86  Section 304 of that statute “provides that 
‘any person may commence a civil action’ in federal district court to enjoin 
violations of emission standards or limitations, as well as enforcement orders and 
certain types of permit violations.”87  While the courts have “consistently viewed § 
304 as a broad grant of jurisdiction obviating battles over the directness of the injury 
inflicted . . . they nonetheless recognized the limits imposed by Article III, and found 
§ 304 did not confer standing on plaintiffs that failed to assert any cognizable 
                                                                    
80  Id. at 1359. 
81  Id. at 1335. 
82  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 23–31. 
83  U.S. Const. art. III; see Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 19. 
84  Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in Environmental Suits and the 
Constitution, 21 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 27, 36 (2003). 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000)). 
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injury.”88  The courts took the same approach to actions brought under the citizen 
suit provisions of the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act,  and Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).89  While these statutes authorized 
individuals or groups to bring lawsuits premised on covered environmental 
violations, plaintiffs were limited to injuries specified by the statute.  Whether the 
congressional intent behind these statutes was to shift the economic burden of 
environmental destruction to private companies or to protect natural entities,90 
they do not go far enough in the face of today’s environmental threats.  In order to 
protect natural entities from exploitation and degradation, they must have access 
to the range of legal options a recognized person would.  It is exactly this project 
that the lawyers and activists behind the Colorado River case undertook. 
I I I .  T HE  C O L O R A D O  R I V E R  C AS E  
In Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado,91 the plaintiffs petitioned the court to 
grant environmental personhood to the Colorado River Ecosystem.92  They then 
argued, by implication, that this personhood would entitle the Ecosystem to 
standing in federal court for violations of its constitutional rights.93  The complaint 
put a great deal of emphasis on the normative foundation for the lawsuit, including 
extended discussions of the perils of climate change, corporate personhood, and the 
international success of the Rights of Nature doctrine.94  It put far less emphasis on 
specific facts that could satisfy the standing requirements.95  For lawsuits brought 
on behalf of nature to succeed, or at least be considered on their merits, they must 
plead tangible injury to the natural entities at issue.  Here, it is possible the plaintiffs 
did not do the necessary research to survive the standing challenge.  However, it is 
more likely that the complaint was purposefully drafted to highlight the overarching 
philosophical and political issues at play.  Especially in the fourth count, sufficient 
                                                                    
88  Id. at 37. 
89  Id. at 37–38. 
90  See id. at 37 (discussing Congressional intent for enacting such statutes); cf. Heather Elliot, 
Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 161 (2011) (discussing Congress’s 
power to expand the standing doctrine). 
91  No. 17-cv-02316-NYW (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2017). 
92  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
93  Id. at 27. 
94  Id. at 17–22. 
95  See id. at 23–33. 
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facts existed to support a narrower, targeted argument for standing.96  The 
plaintiffs dedicated most of their complaint to persuading the court that their cause 
was worthy of consideration, instead of satisfying technical justiciability 
requirements.97  Even if the court had recognized the Ecosystem’s personhood, any 
person seeking to bring a suit would still need to make a showing of injury, 
traceability, and redressability.  In order to make progress through legal claims on 
behalf of natural entities, environmental organizations must focus on a stronger 
and more sophisticated litigation strategy. 
A closer analysis of the Ecosystem’s amended complaint and the State’s motion 
to dismiss sketches the contours of the standing issue.  The plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint included four counts for declaratory and injunctive relief, all of which 
failed on standing grounds.98  In the first three counts, they failed to allege 
particularized injury to the Colorado River Ecosystem.99  In the final count, the 
plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury, but failed to meet the redressability prong.100 
The first count alleged that the failure of the courts to grant the River legal 
recognition constituted a violation of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment 
and the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment.101  The plaintiffs argued that 
the “[d]efendant fails and refuses to recognize the rights of the Colorado River 
Ecosystem, including by refusing to recognize the Ecosystem’s right to appear in 
court.”102  However, such a claim is insufficient to establish actual injury to the 
Ecosystem.  The State’s failure to recognize the Ecosystem’s rights as a person is too 
attenuated to constitute actual injury; if the Ecosystem was not recognized by the 
legislature as a person, then Colorado’s refusal to allow it to appear in court is not a 
violation of the Petition Clause.103  The Colorado legislature has not recognized the 
rights of the Ecosystem, which is its democratic prerogative.104  Moreover, the 
Ecosystem’s current inability to litigate its grievance stems from Article III standing 
                                                                    
96  Id. at 27–32 (discussing specific harm to the Ecosystem). 
97  See id. at 17–22. 
98  Id. at 23–33. 
99  See id. at 23–27. 
100  See id. at 27–31. 
101  Id. at 23–24. 
102  Id. at 24. 
103  See generally Benjamin Plener Cover, The First Amendment Right to a Remedy, 50 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1741, 1744–47 (2017) (explaining the Petition Clause). 
104  Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 885 (1983) (“But legal injury is by definition no more than the violation of 
a legal right; and legal rights can be created by the legislature.”). 
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requirements and the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, not from any 
action by the State.105 
Furthermore, under the procedural due process doctrine, the State’s failure to 
recognize the ecosystem’s “inherent rights to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve” 
do not qualify as a “deprivation of life or liberty.”106  As these rights do not currently 
exist, the State cannot deprive the Ecosystem of the due process that would be 
necessary to protect them.  While the plaintiffs focus on the deprivation of life or 
liberty, the more interesting issue is whether there is a violation of the Ecosystem’s 
property rights.107  If the State were to recognize the Ecosystem as a person, would 
its due process claim have more traction if it was based on the Ecosystem’s property 
interest?  While this approach would be more intellectually congruous than relying 
on the rights to life and liberty, the lack of detailed injury would still be fatal. 
The second count asserted that the River was entitled to legal recognition of its 
rights to exist, to flourish, to regenerate, to be restored, and to naturally evolve.108  
Here, the plaintiffs relied on the substantive due process doctrine under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to claim a violation of the River’s right to life and liberty.109  
They alleged that the “[d]efendant fails and refuses to recognize the rights of the 
Colorado River Ecosystem, including by refusing to recognize the Ecosystem’s right 
to life and liberty, and to exist, flourish, and naturally evolve.”110  They went on to 
argue that the “[d]efendant’s policy and practice of failing and refusing to recognize 
the fundamental rights of the Colorado River Ecosystem violates those rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”111  Again, these allegations suffer from a lack of 
particularity.  In order to establish an injury, the plaintiffs need to point to specific 
and well-pleaded instances of actual rights violations.112  Additionally, this count 
asked the court to recognize new substantive due process rights.113  Courts are 
exceedingly reluctant to grant new rights, as many judges believe that such 
                                                                    
105  See U.S. Const. art. III; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
106  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 23. 
107  For a discussion of this question, see, for example, Lee P. Breckenridge, Can Fish Own Water? 
Envisioning Nonhuman Property in Ecosystems, 20 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 293, 293–94 (2005), and 
W. Earl Webster, How Can Mother Nature Get to Court? The Status of the Standing Doctrine in a Post 
Laidlaw Landscape, 27 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 453, 467–68 (2007). 
108  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 25. 
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111  Id. 
112  See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
113  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 25. 
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decisions are beyond the bounds of judicial power.114  This request presents a burden 
too heavy for a court to shoulder, especially atop the plaintiffs’ requests for 
recognition of environmental personhood and standing for nature.  This claim 
undermines the plaintiffs’ other claims by seeking an unrealistic form of relief.  The 
plaintiffs should have avoided this claim in an effort to legitimize the suit and 
bolster their other claims. 
The third count claimed a violation of the River’s right to equal protection.115  
The plaintiffs contended that the State’s “failure to recognize the rights of the 
Colorado River Ecosystem, while recognizing, and, in fact, elevating corporate 
rights above the Ecosystem’s rights, violates the Colorado River Ecosystem’s right 
to equal protection.”116  Again, the lack of specific violations of the Ecosystem’s equal 
protection rights is fatal to its claim.  The plaintiffs pointed to the State’s treatment 
of corporations and its failure to provide the Colorado River the same rights.117  
However, other than the right to personhood, they did not enumerate any other 
rights or any actual circumstances in which the State has interfered with those 
rights.118  If this count had been pleaded with sufficient specificity to show actual 
injury, it may have succeeded. 
In 1886, the Supreme Court “noted that it did not wish to hear argument in 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.119 on the question of whether 
corporations were protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, since the Justices ‘[we]re all of opinion that it does.’”120  This point was 
made summarily and with no reliance on existing precedent.121  The equal 
protection right of corporations has been consistently reaffirmed over the years, 
fueled by the idea “that corporations exist to protect the property interests of their 
owners and can therefore assert those interests in litigation.”122  If the 
environmental personhood of the River were similarly established by the court, it 
would be entitled to equal protection under the law.  However, the court had no 
occasion to make such a determination on the merits because the plaintiffs failed to 
                                                                    
114  Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and 
the Bill of Rights, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 833, 833–34, 837 (2003). 
115  Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
116  Id. at 27. 
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establish standing. 
The fourth count alleged that certain actions taken by the State had violated the 
rights of the Ecosystem to “exist, flourish, regenerate, be restored, and naturally 
evolve.”123  The plaintiffs argued that “[a]ctions taken by Defendant, to approve 
permits and issue other regulatory approvals for certain actions regarding the 
Colorado River Ecosystem” would violate these rights.124  They cited examples of 
these violations, which included water pollution from the Gold King Mine, over-
allotment of the River’s water, and the destructive impact on the Ecosystem of dams 
operating along the River.125  This count may adequately state an injury but falters 
on redressability.  It is not clear from the complaint that recognizing the rights of 
the River would adequately address these issues.  If the complaint had clarified how 
a recognition of rights could redress the referenced examples of environmental 
harm, it may have survived on this count.  For example, the complaint could have 
argued that recognition as a person would allow the ecosystem to request an 
injunction on specific harmful activities or monetary damages for mitigation.  
However, as it was drafted, this count could not survive a justiciability inquiry. 
The State’s motion to dismiss makes several persuasive arguments regarding 
the court’s lack of jurisdiction: 
First, the Amended Complaint is barred by the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.  
Second, the Amended Complaint fails to prove constitutional standing under Article III.  
The Amended Complaint alleges hypothetical future injuries that are neither fairly 
traceable to actions of the State, nor redressable by a declaration that the ecosystem is a 
“person” capable of possessing rights.  Third, the Amended Complaint fails to 
demonstrate jurisdiction under any other federal statute in the absence of an actual case 
or controversy under Article III.  Fourth, the Amended Complaint presents a non-
justiciable issue of public policy.  Whether the ecosystem should have the same rights as 
people, and who should be allowed to assert those rights in federal courts, are matters 
reserved to Congress by the Constitution.126 
The State’s second argument is the most germane to issues of environmental 
personhood and standing for nature.  The challenges in the State’s motion were 
insurmountable based on the way the plaintiffs drafted the complaint and 
structured the lawsuit.  In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their 
amended complaint, stating that the lawsuit was a “good faith attempt to introduce 
the Rights of Nature doctrine to our jurisprudence” but that such an effort is 
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admittedly a “difficult and legally complex matter.”127  The issue is indeed difficult 
and complex.  However, if even the plaintiffs in the Colorado River case agreed that 
the case should be dismissed, would it be possible to address the State’s arguments 
and achieve legal recognition for the rights of nature?  If the plaintiffs had drafted 
their pleadings in a way that met the requirements for standing and not as a Rights 
of Nature manifesto, they would have had a much better chance to litigate the case 
on the merits and make inroads toward the recognition of environmental 
personhood. 
I V.  R I GH T S  OF  NAT UR E  I N T HE  I NT E R NA T I ONA L  DO MA I N 
While a legally insufficient complaint is not the proper place for public policy 
advocacy on the Rights of Nature, I argue that legislatures and courts in the United 
States should move in the direction of recognizing such rights by looking to the 
international community—and a few jurisdictions here in the U.S.—as models.  
Over the last decade, the rights of nature have been legally recognized by countries 
and communities around the world.  In 2008, Ecuador changed its constitution 
through a national referendum to recognize rights for nature.128  Nature now has 
rights “to exist, persist, maintain[,] and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, 
functions[,] and its processes in evolution,” and every person and community can 
advocate for it.129  In 2010, Bolivia legally recognized “Mother Earth” as a “collective 
public interest” through legislative action.130  All of nature now has certain rights 
enumerated by law in that country.131 
In New Zealand, ideas of environmental personhood were partially spurred by 
Stone’s 1972 article, which inspired two Maori scholars to advocate for granting 
personhood to rivers.132  Their efforts resulted in the decision to grant personhood 
to the forest Te Urewera and the Whanganui River.133  In India, Rights of Nature 
developments followed a similar track to those in New Zealand and specific natural 
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entities were considered for legal recognition.134  In 2012, the Indian Supreme Court 
declared the legitimacy of considering “non-anthropocentric views of the 
protection of nature.”135  In March 2017, a court recognized the Ganga River Basin 
as a legal person entitled to the rights that come along with personhood.136  Notably, 
several local communities in the United States have already taken similar measures 
to recognize some form of rights for nature, including Tamaqua Borough and 
Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania, and local communities in Maine, New Hampshire, and 
California.137 
All of these legal developments suggest that the Rights of Nature doctrine is 
gaining steam on the international stage.  Many of them stem from legislative 
action and constitutional referenda.138  In several countries, rights of nature have 
been judicially enacted.139  While progress continues to be made internationally, 
these precedents will most likely fail to sway American courts to recognize rights for 
natural entities in the United States.  Recognizing such rights to natural objects and 
allowing them to sue in court still requires “an imaginative expansion of our 
traditional concepts of standing.”140  In order to persuade judges to adopt such a 
doctrine, we must rely on more practical arguments—such as those posited above—
to shift the way they conceive of personhood and legal standing. 
V.  I S S UE S  OF  R E P R E S E NT AT I ON 
Nature does not have an actual voice.  Thus, it would require some form of 
representation in order to appear in court.  However, this issue has not been an 
impediment for a legion of other entities that have accrued legal rights.  As Stone 
pointed out in 1972, voiceless entities who can appear in court include corporations, 
“states, estates, infants, incompetents, municipalities [and] universities.”141  Under 
the third-party standing doctrine, an organization is permitted to bring a legal 
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action on behalf of a third party if it meets certain requirements.142  The application 
of the third-party standing doctrine in the context of a natural entity raises a serious 
concern: how can an organization understand nature’s best interests?  It’s a task for 
which human beings have proved themselves particularly unsuited and could 
present an ongoing challenge.  One way to approach the issue would be to lay down 
a broad rule that nature seeks to continue existing in a state of wildness.  This rule 
would essentially harken back to the rights of nature before humans arrived on the 
scene. 
Stone’s solution for this practical problem was for a “friend of a natural object 
[who] perceives it to be endangered” to “apply to a court for the creation of a 
guardianship.”143  He suggested that either current guardianship statutes could 
accommodate the guardianship of natural objects, or “special environmental 
legislation could be enacted along traditional guardianship lines.”144  Babcock took 
issue with Stone’s proposal because it would “take time and impose administrative 
costs on the plaintiff.”145  Instead, she offered a variation on the proposal, suggesting 
that “having nature represented by a properly qualified lawyer with sufficient 
expertise, resources, and commitment to make arguments on nature’s behalf or 
with a special connection to the resource under threat is all the representation 
nature needs in court.”146  These qualified lawyers “could be from nationally or 
regionally recognized environmental organizations or even from local ones who can 
make the necessary showings . . . .”147  She contended that her approach “eliminates 
the need for a court to appoint a guardian and the reliance on a human plaintiff to 
complain about nature’s injuries.”148 
Babcock’s critique of Stone’s proposal is a legitimate one, as the institutional 
costs of a new guardianship regime would be difficult to swallow when combined 
with the existing resistance to establishing standing to nature.  However, Babcock’s 
alternative proposal presents challenges of a different kind by entrusting the 
representation of natural entities to national environmental organizations.  Part of 
the issue for any court considering whether to recognize the legal rights of nature 
will inevitably be the optics of such a “radical” opinion.  If the court were to give a 
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national organization the right to represent any such plaintiff simply because it has 
the resources and expertise to do so, the opinion would risk immediate 
politicization and cultural backlash.  Requiring a local organization with members 
who interact with and benefit from the natural entity, similar to the next friends in 
the Colorado River case, would help avoid such contentious politicization and ensure 
that such litigation be brought by actual members of the ecosystem.  While national 
organizations would be allowed to provide support to the lawsuit, they would not be 
able to become the sole representative of the environmental plaintiff. 
C ONC L US I ON 
There is a near-unanimous consensus in the scientific community that man-
made climate change is real, is accelerating, and is having a major and continuing 
impact on our environment.149  Babcock makes a stark case for allowing nature to 
advocate for its rights in court: 
It is important to give nature the independent legal right to go to court to protect 
itself from harm because the current system will not allow others to intervene on 
nature’s behalf. . . . [T]hird parties face nearly insurmountable barriers when they 
advocate for nature in court.  The executive branch is perpetually hampered by limited 
resources, and occasionally a lack of will, when it comes to protecting nature from harm.  
Congressional paralysis (or worse), in matters affecting the environment has made that 
branch of government the least effective of all.  The existing situation has real 
consequences for the environment—“hundreds of thousands of species on the brink of 
extinction, and only a tiny fraction will ever find activists in or out of the government to 
defend them.”150 
This passage highlights the urgency of recognizing the rights of nature in court.  It 
also raises one of the counterarguments: while the judicial path is the most efficient 
way to establish environmental personhood, there are significant separation of 
powers concerns.  However, there is strong precedent for the Court to shape the 
justiciability doctrines through robust interpretation.151  In the Court’s recent 
standing jurisprudence, there have been instances where the Court did not grant 
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standing to parties where Congress had arguably granted it.152  The effort to 
encourage courts to recognize environmental personhood and standing for nature 
faces an uphill battle and the most certain way to achieve this objective is through 
legislative action.  Nevertheless, courts are well within their power to recognize such 
a doctrine. 
The other major challenge to standing for nature is administrative; many critics 
argue that allowing such suits would lead to an influx in litigation brought on behalf 
of natural entities.153  However, as addressed above, recognizing environmental 
personhood does not automatically grant standing for nature.  The individual or 
organization bringing the suit on behalf of a natural entity would be required to 
demonstrate Article III standing by showing injury, traceability, and 
redressability.154  These requirements, especially as they have been construed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, continue to present significant barriers to environmental 
litigants.155  For example, even if the Colorado River’s right to sue on its own behalf 
had been recognized, the deficient pleadings submitted by the plaintiffs would not 
have survived the standing analysis.  Additionally, the expense associated with 
environmental litigation would discourage quixotic lawsuits.  In order to make a 
showing to meet the standing requirements, the natural entity’s next friends would 
need to commission studies and engage scientific or technical experts.  These 
practical challenges would prevent the courts from being overrun with frivolous 
actions while opening the door to meritorious lawsuits where environmental 
devastation could be avoided or redressed through litigation. 
For such meritorious lawsuits to proceed, organizations must develop a more 
focused and nuanced litigation strategy that pleads specific injury to the natural 
entity, a clear link between the injury and the state action, and realistic remedies 
that would sufficiently reverse or mitigate the injury.  Only through such a strategy 
can advocates and activists hope to advance the causes of environmental 
personhood and standing for nature in the courts. 
                                                                    
152  Babcock, supra note 10, at 13. 
153  Id. at 45. 
154  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
155  See Babcock, supra note 10, at 13 (“[S]tarting in 1990 and continuing almost unbroken to the 
present, the Court has issued decisions, especially in environmental cases, contracting the ability 
of plaintiffs to gain access to federal courts to remedy alleged wrongs—access that, in some cases, 
Congress arguably assured them of.” (footnotes omitted)). 
